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Method as the Embodiment of Reason 
by Bryan Crable 
Department of Communication, Purdue University 
The introductory ideas 
Through [the writing of laws on the body by modern discourses], living 
beings are 'packed into a text' (in the sense that products are canned or 
packed), transfonned into signifiers of rules (a sort of 'intextuation') an~ 
on the other hand, the reason or Logos of a society 'becomes flesh' (an 
incarnation). (de Certeau 140) 
I begin with a quote from Michel de Certeau's The Practice of Everyday Life, 
because this quote describes the point at which I want to enter the debate on the 
topic at hand, Reason. 1 I want (through this quote) to identify the focus of this es-
say: the intersection between body, society, and the Logos. I believe that the dis-
courses of Reason function today simultaneously to subject the individual body to 
their laws and to cause the individual body to assist in the reproduction of these 
laws. Therefore, I address within this essay how the constraints of societal dis-
course function to "make Reason flesh," in the process preventing "the flesh" (the 
everyday practices of our lives) from becoming incorporated into Reason. 
This is not to suggest that we, as the bodies in this situation, are doomed merely 
to fulfill the demands of an anonymous discourse. As de Certeau argues, the closed 
circle described by this relationship between societal discourse and individual can 
be-and continually is-broken. This breaking through/away from such societal 
discourse does not, though, occur through political activism, nor does it find its 
basis in political theory. This individual movement away from the discourses of 
Reason is, instead, enacted in our everyday lives. De Certeau shows how we,, as 
individuals are not passive consumers of the world around us. We are, rather, active 
1 I also want to begin with an acknowledgment: I am indebted to Edward Schiappa, 
Calvin Schrag, William Rawlins, Myrdene Anderson, and an outside reviewer for 
their many instructive comments about earlier versions of this essay. 
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participants in a world. In our daily activities of walking, cooking, telling stories, 
we appropriate and reinscribe: we individualize society, make it our own and can, in 
the process, change it. It is in this spirit that I offer the following essay; as an ap-
propriation of one aspect of the modernist legacy, that of traditional notions of 
method, and as a reinscription and redescription of what we mean by "method." As 
I write these words on Reason, I write about the laws/words/assumptions that I have 
inherited, and, at the same time, create an alternative conception of method, an al-
ternative space for my own research. 
Use of the tenn "research" might be taken to signify "academic" writings, and 
thus distinguish them from "non-academic" work. However, my use of the tenn 
implies no such distinction. I want to break down the distinction invoked between 
"academic" and "non-academic" discourses, and move toward the study of everyday 
experiences and actions. I argue that a redefinition of "method" is one way in which 
such a move can be made. Within the boundaries of this essay, therefore, I turn to 
the world of academia and discuss the ways in which the legacies of Reason sepa-
rate everyday activities from "methodical" activities. In the second half of the essay, 
I consider an alternative way to view "method," in the hopes that such a redefinition 
can open up the discourses of academia to allow consideration of different ways of 
engaging the world, an embrace of the many different practices of everyday life. I 
take for my organizing principle two related meanings of the following phrase: 
method as the embodiment of reason. 
Method as embodiment of reason (pt. I): 
"method" as a source of legitimacy 
As a participant in academia, I have found that one of the more important and 
ubiquitous legacies of Enlightenment Reason is the notion of "method." Tradi-
tionally, research in social science (not to mention natural science) has relied a great 
deal upon the articulation and application of proper methods. This reliance is based 
upon a conception of "method" as an instrument that, when used properly by the 
scholar, yields valid results. One origin of this conception of "method" can be 
found in Descartes' "Discourse on Method," where he explicitly creates linkages 
between Reason and method. 
Descartes argues that the goal of his research has always been "to distinguish 
truth from falsehood, so that I could make intelligent decisions about the affairs of 
this life and act with greater confidence" (9). In order to achieve this goal, Des-
cartes writes that he detennined to "seek no other knowledge than that which I 
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might find within myself: or perhaps in the book of nature" (8). For Descartes, what 
separates his quest for knowledge about the world from those of others is not the 
scholar conducting it; rather, it is the method employed in the inquiry. He notes that 
"differences of opinion are not due to differences in intelligence, but merely to the 
fact that we use different approaches and consider different things . . . . [T]hose 
who walk slowly can, if they follow the right path, go much farther than those who 
run rapidly in the wrong direction" ( 4 ). 
For Descartes, therefore, a correct understanding of reality involves a striving to 
find and follow the correct path. Indeed, Descartes notes that he spent much time 
preparing for his inquiry into the truth of reality by "seeking the true method of 
obtaining knowledge of everything which my mind was capable of understanding" 
(14). Since he feared the obscuring of his results through the influence of prejudg-
ments and preconceptions, he resolved to eliminate everything from his reasoning 
"unless it presented itself so clearly and distinctly to my mind that there was no 
reason or occasion to doubt it" ( 15). Rationality for Descartes was achieved through 
discovery and application of a correct method-moving forward from ideas that 
appeared clear and distinct, moving from evident truths to further truths. In this 
way, Descartes hoped to shut off his own preconceptions and speak the language of 
reality. He hoped to achieve this by establishing rules for himself in advance, 
"ma[king] a finn and unalterable resolution not to violate them even in a single 
instance" (15). By devotedly following these rules, by "conducting all [his] 
thoughts according to [the method's] rules" (22), Descartes argued that he could 
ensure the validity of his results. He argued that he could sort out the questionable 
prejudices from acceptable truths. 
For Descartes, therefore, knowledge about the truth of reality came from the de-
duction of truths from truths according to an explicit set of rules. His method, his 
rules or criteria laid down in advance, ensured that he would not allow his own 
prejudgments to influence his conclusions. Indeed, according to Descartes, "I began 
with the most simple and general, and each truth that I found was a rule which 
helped me to find others, so that I not only solved many problems which 1 had pre-
viously judged very difficult, but also it seemed to me that toward the end I could 
detennine to what extent a still unsolved problem could be solved, and what proce-
dures should be used in solving it" (17). Therefore, Reasoned inquiry became a 
matter of rule-following based upon clear and distinct ideas. Reason became a 
matter of eliminating via method all thoughts that do not correspond to the truth of 
nature. Descartes believed that he had found a method that enabled him to validly 
reason about subjects in all areas of inquiry. He believed that he had discovered 
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the correct path, the correct method for rationally determining truth from falsity 
( 17). Thus, for Descartes, the methodical scholar became the epitome (or embodi-
ment) of Reason in inquiry. 
Indeed, Reason and method are still linked in this way today. An illustration: 
when I entered graduate school and turned my focus to rhetorical criticism, I was 
not just turned loose with a word processor and a text to examine. Rather, I was 
trained. Trained, that is, in the methods of analysis proper to this field. As one 
author of a basic textbook on rhetorical method writes, "we engage in the process of 
rhetorical criticism constantly and often unconsciously, but with some formal train-
ing, we can become more adept and discriminating in its practice" (Foss 3). This, I 
suggest, is a very common experience for those of us in academia-but it is pre-
cisely the experience that reinforces and recreates the distinction between the activi-
ties we normally engage in and "methodical" practices. 
This is not to say, however, that such an experience is limited to those of us in 
academia. In everyday life, we can easily see such the status accorded "methodical" 
activities. For example, in the realm of music, there are books and videos for the 
beginner labeled guitar or piano "method." Smokers also can find programs that 
teach the "proven method" to stop smoking; other advertisers during daytime tele-
vision frequently claim that their product is "more effective than any other weight-
loss method." Although I am going to restrict my focus to the realm of academia in 
this essay, it is clear that "method" enjoys a privileged status in both "academic" and 
"non-academic" discourses. This privilege enjoyed by method is, I believe, derived 
from the identification of Reason with method. 
Due to the equation of Reason with method, any activity that does not qualify as 
"methodical" is, by definition, irrational-and is delegitimized automatically. The 
traditional conception of "method," therefore, marks a division between those prac-
tices that are conducted under the auspices of Reason and those that are not. Such a 
distinction, I believe, functions to prevent many everyday practices of our lives from 
being considered as legitimate, rational analyses of the world. I argue that there are 
three interrelated assumptions that set activities traditionally defined as 
"methodical" apart from those seen as "non-methodical": a method is a path leading 
to a desired goal, a method follows rules established in advance, and a method ex-
ists separately from the critic. 
First of all, a "method" is a path that leads to a particular destination. Indeed, 
"method" is derived from the Greek term methodos, meaning" following a road" or 
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"following a way." It appears in Aristotle's On Rhetoric, where Aristotle defines 
"method" (in the context of rhetoric) as answering "how and from what sources we 
may reach our objective" (1.1.14). When "method" is tied to the directive notion of 
moving along a "path" or "way," it becomes easy to see the necessity of finding the 
right path. If we are using an "improper method" or no method at all, we find our-
selves traveling upon a path that does not go in the desired direction. Thus, in order 
to reach the destination of our choice, we need the right method. 
Our method, then, becomes a sort of guarantee: if we use the right method, we 
will find what we are looking for. For example, when interpreting a text, we need to 
choose a method that will reveal the secrets we seek in the text. If I want, therefore, 
to uncover the motives that are inherent in the situation presented in John Barth's 
novel The Floating Opera, I tum to Kenneth Burke's pentad. The assumption here 
is that the pentad gives me access to the text such that I can see a character's motives 
as they really are in the text. Finding the right method consequently can be seen as 
securing an epistemological guarantee. A method is like a conveyer belt; if I get on 
the right one, it takes me to my destination. This assumption is evident in Descartes' 
text; he argued that he was able to solve difficult problems and arrive at certain truth 
because he had found the right method. As a rhetorical critic, the right method 
similarly allows me to state definitively what a text means by providing me access to 
the text as it really is. 
However, in order to reach the truth of the text, I need to be able to distinguish 
what I see in the text from what is really there. In other words, I need to be able to 
make sure that my analysis is not skewed by my own preconceptions. This intro-
duces the second assumption of "method" as traditionally defined. A method en-
ables us, according to Descartes, to eliminate any of our biases that might affect our 
results because it involves adhering to criteria and rules that are specified in ad-
vance. We can ensure that we are following the correct path because we can match 
our procedure against the steps of the method. In determining the motives in The 
Floating Opera, I will know that I am on the right track because I can make sure 
that I follow a few simple steps. I first identify the protagonists in the dramatic 
situation of the novel: the agent, the act, the agency, the scene, and the purpose. 
Finally, I examine the ratios that are inherent between any two terms. Following 
these steps of the pentad will quite naturally lead to my discovery of the motives 
inherent in the text. 
One important thing should be. noted about the rules that are followed. The 
rules of the method are established in advance-they are not derived from my en-
disClosure 5 (1996): REASON JNCorporated 
112 Bryan Crable 
counter with Barth's text. This is because, as Descartes argued, antecedently speci-
fying the rules to be followed prevents one's preconceptions from influencing the 
results. The method is derived prior to its application, so that using the method 
requires merely measuring the object of study against the method's criteria. This 
means that the object of study is not analyzed according to the impressions that I 
receive from it, impressions that might be mistaken. Rather it is evaluated using 
rules that have already proven true. Thus, biases are neutralized because the 
evaluation of the object of study is performed not by any individual person (who 
may be prejudiced or deceived), but by the method, which is the voice of truth. 
In my analysis of The Floating Opera, therefore, I will know that I have deter-
mined the motive as it really is given in the text because I did not discover my pro-
cedure in the text itself Rather, the pentad has already proved valid as a method to 
establish motives in texts. I will, therefore, know that what I find in the text is really 
there because I am not finding anything in the text; the pentad is doing the finding. 
The antecedently-established rules thus eliminate possible bias and, therefore, guar-
antee that following the right method leads to the desired result 
Implied in the above discussion is the final assumption of "method" as tradi-
tionally defined: method is separate from the person using that method. What this 
means is that a method is seen as something that exists independently of the person 
using the method. Method is neither a part nor an attribute of the critic; it is some-
thing that aids the critic in his or her analyses. Method is applied or utilized, cre-
ated or revised. It is an instrument, something that can be taught in a textbook or a 
class on method. There is, therefore, a distance between the scholar and the method 
that he or she uses-the two are not coextensive. When I examine The Floating 
Opera using the pentad, there is a difference me and the tool that I use on the text, 
the system that I apply to the text, the lens through which I look at the text. 
This assumption is based upon a traditional distinction between subjectivity and 
objectivity. In this view, there is a difference between what I experience as inside 
myself and what I experience as outside myself My "inside" is myself as a subjec-
tivity; that outside me is experienced as objectivity. I am separate from the rock that 
I trip over; I am not the same as the text that I study; my neighbor and I are dis-
tinctly different. I am separate from my method just as I am separate from all of 
these. 
My neighbor and I are both subjectivities, and we both confront an objective 
world, a world that is "out there." Finding ourselves in this situation, we can both 
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make assertions about the things that are outside ourselves. However, we might be 
mistaken in our assertions; we might not be seeing the world in its objectivity. In 
other words, our subjectivities might color what we see. Therefore, we check our 
assertions against the assertions of others, combining our subjectivities into an inter-
subjectivity. We can thus attempt to get as close as possible to the objective world 
by achieving intersubjectivity. 
I argue that this is where "method" enters the picture. The traditional concep-
tion of method functions to assist the achievement of intersubjectivity because it 
allows for replication. "Method" is separate from the person using it; therefore, in 
this view, method acts as a sort of guarantee that my findings correspond to The 
Floating Opera. This is because anyone who is versed in the method that I am us-
ing can "check my work." Any such person can merely replicate the procedure that 
I have followed in my analysis of the text. This person, then, can compare the re-
sults that he or she achieves with my own; they should be compatible. The inter-
pretive community to which I (and my research) belong can work together to 
"correct" any subjective biases that might slip into my analysis. 
Therefore, because "method" is assumed to be something that I use and not 
something that is a part of me, I can use the same method that Kenneth Burke used. 
Other people can use the same method that I use. Furthermore, I can use the same 
method repeatedly over time. It does not matter if the person using the method 
changes, because the method itself is the same-and, thus, the results obtained 
should be the same. It is in this way that method guarantees intersubjectivity; 
method is common property, not unique to a particular individual. This, I believe, 
is what is implied by Descartes when he notes that the only difference between him-
self (who could reach the truth about reality and solve difficult problems) and others 
was the method used. 
In this view, the important part of rationality lies in the method itself; the person 
using the method is secondary. What sets apart Descartes' research is not Descartes 
himself: rather it is the method that he used. According to Descartes, others can use 
' 
this method to the same effect. Differences between people, therefore, are elimi-
nated from the rational process of engaging in a methodical analysis. A proper 
method works to circumscribe the individuality of the person conducting the re-
search. The method allows us to talk about how our research results correspond to 
the way things really are, they allow us to show how our results can be applied be-
yond our own experience. Method~ in this respect, guarantees that the research has 
meaning outside of an individual body at a particular time in a particular situation. 
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Therefore, in the Enlightenment quest for certainty, "methodical" activity becomes 
th~ only type of rational activity. Method shows that the research engaged in was 
rational, and thus is seen as the epitome or the embodiment of Reason. 
Method as embodiment of reason (pt. 2): 
locating reason and method in everyday activities 
The problem that I have with the traditional definition of "method" articulated in 
the. ~r~vious section lies in the exclusionary function that this definition plays: all 
ac:1v1ties ~at do not qualify as "methodical" also do not qualify as rational. Thus, 
this de~t1on of "method" limits what is admissible as a rational analysis within 
aca_ct~Illla Th~ implication is that many everyday activities, activities that may be 
l~gitimate and interesting ways of knowing the world, are excluded from considera-
tio.n .. Indeed, as Calvin Schrag notes, this excludes such activities as poetry and 
pamtmg from counting as rational analyses of our world (Resources 54 ). How, 
then, do we account for Maurice Merleau-Ponty's description of Cezanne as a phe-
nomenologist?2 How do we evaluate Alfred Schutz's argument that Mozart was a 
better philosopher than any philosopher of his time?3 The conceptualiz.ation of 
method that I described in the previous section would reject the activities of both 
Cezanne ~d. Mozart as irrational or "non-rational." I argue, instead, that there are 
many act1v1t1es such as painting, making music, cooking, and walking may have 
much to tell us about the world around us, and thus should be considered rational 
analyses of our world. 
Does this mean that we must reject the notion of "method" altogether in order to 
broaden notions of rationality? Do we need a new term to replace "method" in the 
equation of ~eason and method? Although that is one possible strategy, I believe 
that we can instead engage in a reconceptualiz.ation of what we mean by "method. 11 
Such.~ redefini~ion of "method," in conjunction with and based upon Schrag's re-
~efimtion of ration~ity, would allow us to broaden our discussion of rationality to 
include the many different activities that illustrate the many different ways to engage 
the world around us. 
In The Resources of Rationality, Schrag attempts a refiguration of rationality, 
one that moves away from the "despised Logos" of the Enlightenment, but one that 
: This refers to Merleau-Ponty's wonderful essay, "Cezanne's Doubt." 
This refers to Schutz's essay, "Mozart and the Philosophers." 
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retains the ability to guide our interactions in our socio-historical situation. As 
Schrag argues, "our proposal is that reason is operative in and through the transver-
sal play of discourse and action, word and deed, speaking and writing, hearing and 
reading, in the guise of three phases of communicative praxis: ( 1) discerning and 
evaluating critique; (2) interactive articulation; and (3) incursive disclosure" 
(Resources 9). In short, transversal rationality, as a form of communicative praxis, 
is inevitably bound up with the various interactions, experiences, activities, and 
projects that make up our lives as human beings (Resources 9). Throughout the rest 
of this essay, I attempt to develop an alternative description of "method," one that 
expands the range of what counts as a rational analysis in academia This project is 
necessarily intertwined with Schrag's, but it is more limited in scope. It should be 
noted, however, that my use of the term "rational" or "reason" in conjunction with 
my redefinition of "method" is referring to the expanded notion of rationality that 
Schrag provides in his text.4 
As I noted above, critiquing the traditional way that "method" has been concep-
tualized does not necessitate a jettisoning of the concept of method altogether. We 
can try to formulate new descriptions of what it means to "have a method." The 
redefinition that I attempt in the following pages begins first with a critique of the 
three assumptions identified in the last section as implicit in traditional "method." I 
then conclude with a brief discussion of what implications this expanded notion of 
"method" might have in the realm of academia 
First of all, traditional notions of "method" assume that following a method 
leads to the desired goal. "Method," then, becomes sort of a talisman; finding the 
right path means that one will end up at the destination of one's choice. Such an 
assumption means that applying the pentad to Barth's text leads necessarily to an 
understanding of the motives implicit in the novel, that use of Burke's method gives 
me unmediated access to the reality of the text. However, the problem with such an 
assertion is that it assumes that we can use a method to separate how we see things 
from how things really are, that we can move past changing appearances to get at 
unchanging natures. 
4 Do I therefore accept the equation between Reason and method? I believe that the 
two are necessarily intertwined: an expanded notion of "method" must be based 
upon a similarly expanded notion of what it means to be rational. However, I do not 
mean to reduce this rationality to this notion of "method." I would argue, with 
Schrag, that redefining "method" is, instead, one part of a redefinition of rationality. 
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This assertion is problematic because, as Richard Rorty argues, use of a method 
cannot remove us from our position within human reality. A view of unchanging 
natures cannot be achieved unless we can somehow step outside of our participation 
in human communities and human language. We would have to have a "God's-eye 
view." I argue that we cannot achieve such a standpoint, and that a method, as de-
veloped and expressed in human language, will bring us no closer to such a view. 
The key point of the argument is that we are dealing with language when we 
"represent" reality: "you cannot check a sentence against an object . . . You can 
only check a sentence against other sentences, sentences to which it is connected by 
various labyrinthine inferential relationships" (Rorty I 00). We do not have direct, 
unmediated contact with absolute reality. We compare our assertions to other lin-
guistic representations-not a picture of reality as it "really is." 
This rejection of the "God's-eye view" means that we cannot discover the es-
sence or nature of reality and separate this out from the other properties that we, or 
our language, ascribe to them. It is problematic, therefore, to view using a method 
as "cracking codes, peeling away accidents to reveal essence, stripping away veils of 
appearance to reveal reality" (Rorty 89). Indeed, I argue that we can "talk about" 
the marks on a page of Barth's novel, but that we cannot link our discussions of a 
text to the text as it "really is." As Rorty argues, this problematizes "the idea that 
the text can tell you something about what it wants, rather than simply providing 
stimuli which make it relatively hard or relatively easy to convince yourself or oth-
ers of what you were initially inclined to say about it" (I 03 ). 
The text, like nature, cannot tell us what to think or say about it, it can just cause 
us to hold beliefs. I argue, then, that "reading texts is a matter of reading them in the 
light of other texts, people, obsessions, bits of infonnation, or what have you and 
then seeing what happens" (Rorty I 05). In this view of analyzing texts, I do not 
apply a method to a text in order to discover a bit of truth about the text as it is in 
reality. I cannot achieve a view of the text as it is in reality. Rather, I engage in a 
reading of the text based upon my own predispositions, beliefs, favorite authors, and 
habits of action. Thus, I might read Barth in light of my reading of Jacques Derrida; 
similarly, I might read Barth based upon my own experiments with creative writing. 
Such a type of reading is less an attempt to reach the essence of a text than an activ-
ity engaged in by an individual in response to a text. 
This shift in the stated goal of analysis problematizes the second assumption 
underlying traditional conceptions of "method": following a method entails follow-
ing rules laid out in advance. If we reject the notion that we can achieve a contact 
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with reality through use of a method, it could be argued that we would not need to 
follow a set of rules drawn up ahead of time. However, there is a further problem 
with the idea of a priori criteria. As Schrag argues, when we detennine our criteria 
in advance, we do not (as Descartes believed) avoid biasing our encounter with the 
object of study. Instead, the reverse happens: we skew our results. We detennine in 
advance what we will find. 
As Schrag argues, the use of a priori criteria determines our results in advance 
because stating our criteria in advance also creates a justification for one's results in 
advance. Thus, the reasons that the findings of the inquiry are "correct" are the 
same as the criteria stipulated at the beginning of the project (Schrag, Resources 
54 ). In other words, stating what one is looking for prior to the encounter with the 
text both determines what one is going to find and justifies those findings ahead of 
time. A clear example would be if: as a part of my reading of The Floating Opera, 
consulted two critics' texts on the novel, two texts that offered competing interpre-
tations of a particular chapter. Ifl dete~e my critera ahead of time, stating "I will 
use the text that offers an explanation for a greater amount of the text," I will de-
tennine the text I will select ahead of time as well. Moreover, I will have already 
provided myself with a reason for the choice. Similarly, stating the rules of the 
method in advance means that I will detennine what I will find in the text before I 
even begin analyzing it. 
This does not mean, however, that we must throw out all notions of criteria al-
together. Indeed, as Schrag notes, we can merely reject the notion of a priori crite-
ria Such a rejection attempts to capture the spirit of "discernment" that was origi-
nally in the root of the tenn "critiera." This spirit operates in what Schrag terms 
praxial critique, "a discernment that draws upon the wider functions and faculties of 
the soul in its response to the social practices that extend transversally across the 
polis, providing at once an assessment of these practices and criteria for decision 
and action" (Resources 60). Schrag notes that, in praxial critique, we use criteria 
that are not specified in advance when reacting to a text or making a decision. 
These critiera are instead derived from such elements as our experiences, our be-
liefs, our involvement in a particular community, and our language (Schrag, Re-
sources 64). They are predispositions that are activated in some combination in 
particular cases-and allow us to make decisions based upon those predispositions 
(Schrag, Resources 60). 
Thus, praxial critique is a notion that allows us to problematize the notion of 
criteria specified in advance, but does not deny the possibility of a rational scholarly 
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research. In my encounter with The Floating Opera, I am already laden with expe-
riences, preferences, prejudices, and beliefs that aJready orient me to the world (and 
to the novel itself) in some way. Criteria for the decision are then already a part of 
me. The encounter with the text, however, might cause one or more to become 
relevant in my reaction to and analysis of the situation. My favorite film might be-
come relevant in my reading of Barth's text; similarly, my reading of the text might 
caJl to mind my fascination with old-fashioned steamboats. Indeed, Kenneth 
Burke's texts may even come to mind. In this case, Burke's discussion of motives 
may guide my reading of Barth's novel, without turning into a recipe that I must 
state ahead of time and strictly follow. In this view, I would be engaged in an 
analysis based upon discerned rules, not an attempt to achieve the reality of the text 
through following a priori rules. 
In this redefinition of "method," thus, the rules or criteria used in the analysis 
arise from the predispositions of an individual as they become relevant in the en-
counter with the object of study. This implies a rejection of the third assumption 
underlying traditional assumptions of "method": a method is separate from the per-
son using it. In the arguments provided above concerning the first two traditional 
assumptions of "method," we have moved toward a more individualized conception 
of method. Insofar as we both move away from viewing method as a path to truth 
and associate the rules or criteria of a method with the preconceptions of the 
scholar, we move toward an association of the method itself with the individuality 
of the scholar. 
Such an individualized description of method is suggested by de Certeau's text 
as well. The main thesis of de Certeau's text is that societal discourse (for example, 
a method such as the pentad) is always individualized by those who are the consum-
ers of such discourse. Thus, we might argue that it is quite possible (and, indeed, 
certain) that the hegemonic method is personalized by the idiosyncrasies of the 
scholar engaged in an analysis. As de Certeau argues in the case of reading a text, 
the individual reader "invents in texts something different from what they 'intended.' 
He [or she] detaches them from their (lost or accessory) origin. He [or she] com-
bines their fragments and creates something un-known in the space organized by 
their capacity for allowing an indefinite plurality of meaning" (169). 
In the case of method, then, our analyses are personalized by the use to which 
we put any particular method, the connections that we make between any particular 
method and any other part of our experience. De Certeau might illustrate this per-
sonalization of method by comparing it to renting an apartment. He notes that dis-
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courses, like apartments, are individualized by those who inhabit them: "renters 
make . . . changes in an apartment they furnish with their acts and memories" (xxi). 
Therefore, individuaJs essentially engage in improvisation, appropriating but 
changing an existing discourse. The result, according to de Certeau, is a creative 
consumption: "Barthes reads Proust in Stendhal's text; the viewer reads the land-
scape of his childhood in the evening news" (xxi). Therefore, we can argue that it is 
impossible to consider a method apart from the uses to which particular people put 
it (xiii). 
In our redefinition of "method," therefore, we find that we cannot separate the 
scholar from his or her method. Each scholar personalizes a particular method in 
the particular uses to which the method is put, the connections that are drawn be-
tween this particular method and another item in the scholar's experience, as well as 
the motives that make that particular method relevant to the scholar. It is in the 
analysis, then, that these differences become evident-the scholar's creativity is 
shown in his or her improvisation upon the themes of the method. It is in this sense 
that we can problematize the notion that two people can use the "same" method, or 
that one person at different times uses the "same" method. In both of these in-
stances, we are not describing the "same" method: the method will vary between 
each situation because it will be individualized. 
For example, the Burkean pentad, as it appears in my analysis of The Floating 
Opera , will differ from the pentad as it appears in Kenneth Burke's own writings. 
Moreover, the pentad in my analysis will differ from the pentad as it would appear 
in a colleague's analysis of Barth's novel. Indeed, the pentad in my present analysis 
will differ from the pen tad as it would appear in my analysis of the same text twenty 
years from now. The difference between the methods involved in each of these 
situations lies in the personalized character of the method in each situation. The 
methods used in each case are not the same because they inevitably reflect individ-
ual differences between the people using the method. Thus, we do not apply a pre-
existing instrument to a text. A method, instead, becomes a part of us when we 
appropriate it. Insofar as method is individualized, we cannot eliminate individual 
differences from the picture when we discuss issues of method. 
In this redefinition of "method," we describe method as necessarily bound up 
with such things as the individual researcher's experiences, committnents, and be-
liefs. We might argue, therefore, that a research article displays the results of what 
happened when a particular researcher (with the aforementioned set of beliefs, 
commitments, and motivations) encountered a particular person or aspect of the 
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world .. Thus, this redescription of "method" emphasizes the creative aspect of con-
sumption. ~at de Certeau describes. What becomes important in engaging in such 
an analysis is ~e result of the encounter between the scholar and the object of study. 
Indeed, we s~1ft our focus from the details of the method that was used to the results 
of the ~alys1s. We move from concern with replication of the researcher's results to 
the particular connections that are drawn by the scholar the beli·ec.s · 
, J.: or expenences 
that become relevant in the encounter, the uses to which texts are put. 
11 
Doe~' this, ~owever, sacrifice the intersubjectivity that traditional conceptions of 
method provided by separating researcher and method? I argue that this is onl 
th ·f · Y 
. e ~ase I we continue to base our conception of "method" upon a traditional dis-
tinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Traditional assumptions discussed in 
~~ previous section, i.e. method as separate from the critic or determination of va-
hdi~ through application of a priori criteria, function to prevent individual precon-
ceptions from biasing the results of the analysis. They therefore ensure that the 
results have a meaning that goes beyond the subjective experience of the particular 
res~~cher. In other words, they function as intersubjective "checks" to ensure the 
val1d1ty of the critic's analysis. 
I bel~eve that the effort to maintain intersubjective "checks" on the subjectivity 
of rheton~al crit~c.ism is based upon a problematic view of subjectivity. As Schrag 
~gues, this ~1t1onal, centered view of subjectivity trades heavily upon distinc-
~ons between. inner and outer, expression and meaning, private and public. Tradi-
tional conceptions of subjectivity privilege one half of the binary to the detriment of 
~e other. . ~e notes that such a conception of subjectivity associates 
und~rstandm~ as what goes on within people (and, therefore, has a subjective 
meanmg), whtle "explanation" concerns "external and objective states of affairs" 
(Comm~nic.ative 76). ~is distinction, therefore, separates subjective meaning as 
that which IS so.lely mean~gful to one individual. Subjectivity, in this view, needs 
to be corrected m methodical research by intersubjective "checks" to ensure that the 
results are not merely meaningful to one person. However, I argue that we cannot 
make such a clean separation between subjective and objective meaning. 
. As Schr~g writes, "expressive" statements are not merely "the articulation of 
~n.va~ m~anmg b~ an autonomous speaker"; they always reveal the speaker's par-
ticipation m a particular linguistic community (Communicative 36) Therefore a 
~tic's "subjective ~xpression" always implies familiarity with the .intersubject;ve 
histo~ an~ co~ventions of a particular language. A scholar's discourse always al-
ready unphes mtersubjective agreement, at least at the level of spoken and written 
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language. Indeed, Schrag argues that we cannot separate "inner" subjectivity from 
"outer" objectivity because, in the process of communication, the subjective and the 
objective, the "I" and the "you" emerge in a mutual process of constitution: 
the indexical posture of 'I' is dialectically bonded with the posture of 
'you' as the one being addressed. I as speaker emerge in the presence of 
you as hearer . . I am able to say 'I' only because of an 
acknowledgment of you as my interlocutor within the dynamics of the 
dialogic encounter. The 'I' and the 'you' are as it were coconstituted, 
sharing a common, intersubjective space. (Communicative 125) 
Therefore, I agree with Schrag that no speaker "is an island, entire of itself' 
(Communicative 125). 
Moreoever, an individual's intended meaning in his or her expressive discourse 
and/or action is also subject to interpretation by the individual's audience, and 
therefore expression can have public, intersubjectively-created meaning as well as 
an individual's private, intended meaning (Schrag, Communicative 40). Thus, this 
problematizes the traditional distinctions made in discussion of "method" between 
inner and outer, public and private, subjective precoception and significant mean-
ing. I agree with Schrag that a conception of subjectivity based upon such distinc-
tions needs to be replaced with a conception of subjectivity that encompasses both 
halves of the traditional dichotomy. This new conception of subjectivity is offered 
by Schrag as one in which "the articulated meanings of individual speech acts and 
gestures are at once displays of the intentions of particular speakers and the inscrip-
tions of sense in the history of publicly spoken language" (Communicative 4 7). 
One implication of the blurring of the distinction between "inner" and "outer" in 
our definition of "method" is that the individual scholar's voice becomes more im-
portant in his or her own method. This emphasis upon the voice is similar to that 
called for by Susan Krieger in Social Science and the Self. In this text, Krieger 
proposes that "we ought to develop our own different individual perspectives more 
fully in social science, and we ought to acknowledge, more honestly than we do, the 
extent to which our studies are reflections of our inner lives" ( 1 ). Krieger argues 
that we are directly affected (and, conversely, our research is directly affected) by 
our personal experiences as bodies living in and through the world (29). Thus, ac-
cording to Krieger, we should acknowledge that "the self is not a contaminant, but 
rather that it is the key to what we know, and that methodological discussions might 
fruitfully be revised to acknowledge the involvement of the self in a positive man-
ner" (30). 
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Indeed, my redefinition of "method" would allow us also to engage in such a 
reconceptualization of the relationship between scholar and his or her object of 
research. Rather than seeing the two as separate (or as separable), we would argue 
that continuing the processes of interpretation and reinterpretation would allow us 
to talk in meaningful ways about our experiences of ourselves, other people, and the 
world that we live in. In this redescription, we, as scholars, would not try to elimi-
nate our own voice in the research. Our voice, like the voices of others that we 
might interact with, is an important part of the ongoing dialogue. As Krieger writes, 
she does not want to speak of herself "because I am generally applicable (like a 
theory) or because I am an instance of a more widespread phenomenon (like a piece 
of data), but because I am someone in particular" (34). 
The final consequence of this redefinition of "method" refers to the exclusionary 
function that notions of "method" typically perform. As I noted in the beginning of 
the essay, traditional conceptions of method reinforce the conception that, insofar as 
we use a method when talking about our world, we are "rational," and, insofar as we 
are not trained in method or do not use one, we are engaged in "irrational" or "non-
rational" research. A traditional notion of "method," therefore, erects "methodical" 
activity as a privileged way to interpret the world. This is similar to a situation de 
Certeau describes in terms of texts: 
the use made of the text by privileged readers constitutes it as a secret of 
which they are the 'true' interpreters. It interposes a frontier between the 
te~ and its readers that can be crossed only if one has a passport 
deh~ere.d by these o~cial interpreters, who transform their own reading 
{which ts also a leg1t1mate one) into an orthodox 'literality' that makes 
of!1er (equally. legitimate) readings either heretical (not 'in conformity' 
with the meanmg of the text) or insignificant (to be forgotten). (171) 
When, consequently, we redefine the idea of "method," we can open the realm of 
"methodical" activity to practices heretofore excluded as "irrational." Therefore, the 
many different ways of engaging with and responding to the world around us can 
become a significant part of our scholarly discourse. Indeed, the individualization 
of method described above situates "methodical" activities in the many different 
beliefs, experiences, and practices of individual scholars. 
Expanding notions of "method" to include everyday activities also works to blur 
the distinction between those in academia and those outside it. We expand the no-
tion of "rationality" to cover not only the Enlightenment project of certainty and the 
hegemonic Logos, but also the experiences and attitudes of those who are "non-
academic," those who are actively engaged in movement through and interpretation 
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of the world of everyday life. We situate reason and rationality in the individual 
bodies that make up societies, the bodies that interact and communicate in the pro-
duction and interpretation of meaning. Therefore, we allow the work of individual 
people/bodies such as novelists, journalists, musicians, painters, social activists, and 
construction workers to be legitimate statements about the world that we live in. 
Mozart and Cezanne, for example, can clearly be considered philosophers in such a 
redefinition of "methodical" activity. 
In the process, we can expand the typical focus on deduction and induction, 
procedures that, some argue, do not function in the way that they are articulated in 
traditional research.5 We can instead allow some space for method as abductive, a 
creative "aha!" that shows the performative character of the individual's encounter 
with what he or she is studying. De-mystifying method, then, and situating it in the 
"practices of everyday life" works to subvert one of the important barriers that sepa-
rate academia from other people's lived experience. We then conceive of method as 
(in a second, empowering sense) the embodiment of reason, and, thus, we work to 
bring those of us in academia closer to that which we claim to be studying. 
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by Carol Denson 
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Cu/tch 125 
noun [origin uncertain] 1. rubbish. 2. the various materi~s, such as 
shells, gravel, etc., out of which a spawning bed for oysters is made. 3. 
the spawn of oysters. 
from Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 
The scandal lingers, rough baptismal ballast, 
sounding a life, 
naming a death. A way to begin: the gauze 
an elegy lays 
or rips, rusty impertinent threader. The hedge 
protects but hides 
a killer, rusing traveller rocking back 
to center a sin, 
the easy ignited flow cresting each hill, 
the downhill denial, 
speedy freedom, a quick blind friend. 
The baobab cutters make paper, rope, eat the pulp 
of the gourdlike fruit. 
What change, barb erupted, skulks here? 
What cultch 
rides the barge downriver? Whose channel 
might flow me 
ballast for spawn, cracked rocks to gird my tracks, 
a bed that holds, 
sweet trash to steady, each wasted load 
a gait that sees, 
forgetting the story that clears the gazed path. 
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